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Abstract
This paper tests for the market environment within which US …s-
cal policy operates, that is we test for the incompleteness of the US
government bond market. We document the stochastic properties of
US debt and de…cits and then consider the ability of competing op-
timal tax models to account for this behaviour. We show that when
a government pursues an optimal tax policy and issues a full set of
contingent claims, the value of debt has the same or less persistence
than other variables in the economy and declines in response to higher
de…cit shocks. By contrast, if governments only issue one-period risk
free bonds (incomplete markets), debt shows more persistence than
other variables and it increases in response to expenditure shocks.
Maintaining the hypothesis of Ramsey behavior, US data con‡icts
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1strongly with the predictions of complete markets but is much more
consistent with incomplete markets. We discuss the implications of
this …nding for the optimality of debt limits, debt management and
assessing the sustainability of …scal policy.
Keywords: Complete vs incomplete markets, Debt Management, Govern-
ment Debt, Optimal …scal policy, Tax smoothing
JEL classi…cation: E62, H62, H63.
21 Introduction
In this paper we study the evidence that market incompleteness is an im-
portant feature determining the behavior of the US …scal de…cit and the
evolution of government debt. We do so by answering the question ’What …-
nancial market structure justi…es the way that US government debt responds
to …scal shocks?’. More precisely, we characterize the response of debt to …s-
cal shocks under both complete and incomplete markets and compare these
with the actual behaviour of US debt. Whether bond markets are complete
or incomplete has signi…cant implications for the behaviour of optimal taxes,
the imposition of …scal rules, the assessment of …scal sustainability and the
operation of debt management. Therefore, in order to better design models
for policy analysis, it is important to shed some light on this issue.
Whether market incompleteness is an important issue in the data can-
not be immediately discovered by casual theorizing or casual empiricism. In
many models the Euler equation is identical for complete and incomplete
markets so the issue cannot be resolved by testing orthogonality conditions
as in GMM estimation. Advocates of incomplete markets might say that
due to moral hazard, limited commitment and transaction costs, it is clear
that incomplete markets should be introduced into the analysis of models of
policy. But this is not enough to rule out complete markets as a reasonable
assumption. A recent literature suggests that introducing incomplete mar-
kets into asset pricing models does not substantially in‡uence the behavior
of real variables and asset prices1. In addition a number of authors point out
how through the choice of maturity, using …xed or ‡oating rate debt, price
indexed debt or nominal debt or domestic or foreign currency denominated
debt, the government has access to a wide range of securities, so it might
appear that the complete market model is most appropriate2. By providing
and implementing a simple test for the existence of market completeness our
analysis enables a more de…nitive perspective on this debate.
1Tellmer (1993), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), Marcet and Sin-
gleton (1999), among others, make this point by studying simulations of various incomplete
markets models.
2See, inter alia, Bohn (1990), Calvo and Guidotti (1990), Campbell and Shiller (1996),
de Fontenay, Milessi-Feretti and Pill (1995), Missale (1999), Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu (2000)
and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991). More recently, Angeletos (2002) and Buera
and Nicolini (2003) analyze the case when there are enough maturities to span the set of
possible realizations.
3Testing for the appropriate structure of government debt markets is not
just a matter for theoretical debate but also has important policy implica-
tions. Policy discussion is increasingly focused on placing restrictions on
government debt e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact in Europe, the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment debate in the US, the Code for Fiscal Stability
in the UK. Presumably these constraints are considered in order to prevent
governments from shifting a heavy tax burden to future years and to avoid
increasing incentives to default or utilizing the in‡ation tax. However, with-
out articulating the constraints faced by actual governments when choosing
a debt policy it is impossible to assess the relative merits of alternative …scal
rules. To demonstrate this point, the …nal section of this paper gives a com-
pelling example of how misleading conventional assessment of …scal policy
sustainability may be when the assumption of complete markets is not valid.
Given the objective of this paper, it is unavoidable to make assumptions
about government behavior. The consumption literature revealed a long time
ago that the budget constraint of a consumer cannot be tested in isolation:
additional assumptions are needed to meaningfully test a model, for exam-
ple, that a consumer is a utility maximizer, resulting in a joint test of utility
maximization under a certain budget constraint. For the same reason, we
need to model government behavior in testing for the presence of market
incompleteness, and any test for whether markets are complete or not must
by necessity be of a joint hypothesis of market structure and assumed gov-
ernment behaviour.3
Unfortunately there is not widespread agreement regarding the best way
to model government behavior. Lucas and Stokey (1983) proposed to study
dynamic stochastic models, where the government is assumed to be a benevo-
lent Ramsey social planner who cares about public welfare and takes as given
that quantities are determined in equilibrium. In the last ten years there has
been a substantial literature characterizing the behavior of tax rates under
this assumption (see, inter alia, Judd (1992), Zhu (1992), Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1994), Klein and Rios-Rull (2000) for complete markets ver-
sions and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) and Scott (2003) for
incomplete markets). We follow this approach and assume a Ramsey equi-
librium. By assuming that the government is a benevolent Ramsey planner
we do not intend to invoke this as a precise description of reality (just as
utility maximization of expected discounted utility by consumers should not
3This point, in a di¤erent way, was argued by Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991).
4be taken literally), but given the state of the literature and the sophistication
of the models that can be analyzed under this paradigm this seemed to us
the best place to start. By following this literature and its associated fully
‡edged dynamic stochastic models of government behavior we can articu-
late more clearly the point of this paper, which is how the behavior of debt
varies under complete or incomplete markets and which hypothesis …ts the
data better. It is in this spirit that we adopt the assumption of a Ramsey
planner.4
Some studies back up some of the predictions of Ramsey taxes, for exam-
ple, Barro (1979), Sahasakul (1986), Bizer and Durlauf (1990), Judd (1992),
Hess (1993) and Scott (2003). Although some of these studies reveal details
concerning the behaviour of debt their main focus is on taxation. Hence one
of the contributions of our paper is to provide a comprehensive summary of
the behaviour of debt under optimal taxation. Given the greater reliability
of government debt statistics compared to estimates of the e¤ective average
marginal rate of tax, this recasting of the optimal taxation literature has
empirical advantages. Further, because we focus on the behavior rather than
the structure of debt we are able to arrive at a remarkably straightforward
test for whether government bond markets are complete. This test on the
behaviour of debt is much sharper than trying to detect the presence of unit
roots in tax rate series (see Scott (2003) for the di¢culties in this approach
of testing for market incompleteness).
In Section 2 we document the stylized facts about US debt we wish to
explain. Focusing on post-war data the main results we show are that debt
shows very long lasting swings in response to shocks, far more so than other
variables as re‡ected in a range of persistence measures. Further, VAR anal-
ysis shows that the market value of government debt increases in response to
positive de…cit shocks. In Section 3 we characterize the behaviour of debt un-
der optimal taxes when the government is able to issue a full range of Arrow
contingent securities. We provide a general theorem describing a recursive
formulation for debt; we use this formulation to show that under complete
markets the market value of debt is no more persistent than real variables
in the economy. Further, the market value of debt decreases in response to
a persistent increase in government expenditure shocks. Therefore, the im-
4An alternative would have been to utilise a model from the burgeoning political econ-
omy literature. However, there is much less consensus about how to formulate government
behavior in this literature in a tractable and fully ‡edged dynamic stochastic model with
incomplete markets.
5plications of complete markets are at odds with the established facts in the
previous section. In Section 4 we turn our attention to incomplete markets,
speci…cally, we assume that the government in our model can only issue one
period risk free bonds. Under this assumption, government debt is used as a
bu¤er stock to smooth ‡uctuations. This bu¤er stock behavior causes debt
to be more persistent than other variables in the economy and to increase in
response to adverse de…cit shocks. To be more precise we study two alterna-
tive models, we derive an analytic result for a particular case, and we resort
to simulations to demonstrate the quantitative importance of the e¤ects we
derive.
In Section 5 we consider the implications of our …ndings for the imple-
mentation of …scal policy. Because under incomplete markets government
debt shows long and persistent ‡uctuations we show that it is very di¢cult
for an observer to discriminate between an unlucky Ramsey planner who has
experienced a sequence of adverse shocks and a government which is pursuing
an insolvent …scal policy. This is despite the fact that by construction the
government is a Ramsey optimizer and the intertemporal budget constraint
is being observed. By contrast, under complete markets discrimination be-
tween a Ramsey and an insolvent policy is relatively straightforward. We
discuss the implications of this …nding for the role of debt limits and debt
management.
2 The Behaviour of US Government Debt
The purpose of this section is to establish some stylized facts about debt in
order to evaluate the relevance of our competing theoretical models. Our
focus will be on how debt responds to macroeconomic shocks (compared to
other endogenous variables) and the serial correlation properties of debt.
The theoretical variable of interest is the market value of outstanding
government debt. However, the nearest published equivalent is the face
value of outstanding government debt. As detailed in the Data Appendix
we use the work and methods of Seater (1981), Cox and Hirschorn (1983)
and Butkiewicz (1983) to construct an annual series for the market value cov-
ering the period 1900-99. However, in what follows we focus on the post-1950
period, although none of our results are seriously a¤ected by using the longer
sample. Our focus on the post-1950 data is to exclude the e¤ects of war - it
is well known that inclusion of war time data and resultant structural breaks
6leads to biases in estimates of persistence- so as to focus on business cycle
‡uctuations. Further, there are sound moral hazard reasons to believe that
governments cannot issue war contingent debt so by focusing on the sample
1950-99 we avoid an obvious bias in favor of incomplete markets.
To summarize the properties of the data we consider a minimal VAR
which includes the primary de…cit, GDP and the market value of government
debt. In order to work with data that is roughly stationary, we use the
primary de…cit/GDP ratio, the change in the logarithm of GDP and the
debt/GDP ratio. We use the VAR as a convenient way to summarize the
data and how debt evolves in response to de…cit and GDP shocks. We do
not think of this VAR as a direct way of testing a particular structural model
nor as providing a de…nitive characterization of how …scal policy impacts on
the economy5. In later sections we estimate exactly the same VAR from data
generated by simulations of our theoretical models and in this manner we
are able to compare the data and models in a precise way.
Since we are not aiming to identify structural VAR’s we take a straight-
forward approach to orthogonalization and use triangular leading matrices
(Cholesky decomposition), and then check that if this particular decomposi-
tion brings out the same insights when it is applied to the model. A main
focus of our later analysis will be government expenditure shocks and so we
order the variables by placing the de…cit …rst, output growth in second place
leaving the debt variable to last so we can detail how debt responds to all
other shocks6.
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse response functions from our basic
trivariate VAR speci…cation7 from which we glean the following Facts:
1. Both de…cit and GDP shocks have a large and very persistent e¤ect on
debt. The e¤ect is more persistent than for all other variables.
2. A higher de…cit today signals a higher de…cit over the next …ve or six
years.
5See Blanchard and Perotti (1999) or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2000) for such
an analysis.
6We follow the common practice of calling the …rst orthogonalized shock the ’de…cit
shock’, the second ’the output shock’ and so on. However, we note that this nomenclature
may mislead - for instance, in the models we consider the …rst shock in our estimated VAR
contains a large part of the innovation to productivity, since an innovation to output will
in‡uence tax revenues and, therefore, the de…cit.
7Results are robust to a wide range of di¤erent VAR speci…cations and estimators.
73. the e¤ect of de…cit shocks on debt is positive.
4. the e¤ect of GDP shocks on debt and de…cit is negative.
5. the responses to the debt shock are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero
for the …rst few lags of the Debt/GDP equation. The response to this
shock is also persistent8
Studying impulse response functions provides a highly detailed picture
of interactions between endogenous variables but is sensitive to the ordering
of variables and the assumed number of shocks. Therefore as an additional
more robust (although less informative) measure of persistence we utilize the




V ar(yt ¡ yt¡k)
k Var(yt ¡ yt¡1)
In the case of a stationary and ergodic variable we have Var(yt ¡ yt¡k) !
2 var(yt) as k ! 1. Therefore, for the stationary case Pk
y ! 0 as k ! 1.
For instance, in the case of an i.i.d. process Pk
y = 1=k. By contrast in the
case of a pure unit root P k
y = 1 for all k. Notice also that Pk
y > 1 is consistent
with a wide range of stochastic processes, including a unit root with serially
correlated growth rates10. Hence, the more persistent is variable y, the longer
it takes for Pk
y to go to zero as k grows.
8A puzzle in this VAR is what is meant by debt shocks given that the government
budget constraint states a non-linear identity between debt, de…cits and interest rates.
We have tested if this shock captures interest rate e¤ects, but when we include interest
rates in the VAR the size and e¤ect of the debt shock remains essentially unchanged. Three
possible explanations can be advanced for this debt shock: i) measurement error - over a
long sample there are many changes of de…nition of debt, revaluation e¤ects and asset sales
which will a¤ect the identity; ii) approximation error - a linear VAR may not fully capture
the non-linear nature of the government’s budget constraint and of the Debt/output ratio;
iii) identi…cation problems; it may be that the current identi…cation leaves some de…cit
shocks to appear as ”debt” shocks.
9Cochrane (1988) uses this statistic in the macroeconomics literature to measure per-
sistence in US GDP data.
10It can be shown that P k




k ½j where ½j is the correlation of ¢yt with
¢yt¡j. The rising pro…le of PDebt shown in Figure 2 is therefore consistent with a wide
range of stationary processes for ¢yt:
8Estimates of Pk
y for a selection of key variables are shown in Figure 2.
Since the k variance ratios for debt are far higher than those for other vari-
ables, these con…rm that debt displays substantially more persistence than
all other variables and this persistence is marked even after 10 years11.
Figures 1 and 2 formalize two features of the data that are hardly sur-
prising: debt is more persistent than other variables and debt moves in the
same direction as the primary de…cit.
3 Debt under Complete Markets
Having documented how government debt behaves we now turn our attention
to the theoretical part of our paper and begin by studying the behavior
of debt under complete markets. We show that, in a very large class of
models, equilibrium debt is a time invariant function of the state variables
determining the primary de…cit and interest rates. As a consequence, the
persistence of government debt will be no greater than any of the variables
which determine de…cits and interest rates. Hence, debt under complete
markets is no more persistent than other variables, a prediction which is
inconsistent with the …ndings in section 2 (in particular, with Fact 1 from
our VAR analysis and the k¡variance ratios). We also show that if the
primary de…cit process follows an autoregressive process with positive serial
correlation, as is the case for the US (Fact 2), then under complete markets
debt should decrease in response to an increase in the primary de…cit, so that
Fact 3 is inconsistent with complete markets.
3.1 Recursive Formulation and Persistence of Debt
Consider the following very general setup
Assumptions on the fundamentals of the model.
The variables in the economy are fxt;stg; where st are exogenous shocks
and xt endogenous variables. The process fstg is Markov and, without loss
11Notice that we do not explore persistence by testing for unit roots. We discriminate
between complete and incomplete markets on the basis of the persistence in debt relative
to other variables, in terms of the size of impulse responses and k-variance ratios of debt
relative to other variables. Hence, we are free from the usual criticism of the low power of
unit-root tests.




cluding those shocks known one period ahead and s1
t containing the rest12.
For simplicity, assume that the distribution of the exogenous shocks condi-
tional on the past has a density. There are I agents and each agent at time
t chooses consumption and obtains net income from several sources. We de-
note by !i
t the value of agent i0s de…cit in period t (in units of the numéraire
consumption good), i.e. expenditure minus income at time t.
At time t there exists a spot market for claims contingent on all possible
values of s1
t+1: A bond contingent on a value s1 2 S1 will pay one unit of
the consumption numéraire if s1
t+1 = s1 occurs, and zero otherwise. Here S1
´ [1
t=1fsupport of s1
tg: We denote by bi
t(s1) the quantity of bonds contingent
on the occurrence of s1 purchased by agent i at time t. Hence, agent i has
to choose a function bi
t : S1 ! R in each period, this function may depend
on the period and the realization. The payo¤ of this portfolio next period is
bi
t(s1


















for all agents, periods and realizations. Here pb
t(s1) is the price at time t of
a bond contingent on s1
t+1 = s1. All agents are prevented from defaulting
and from running Ponzi schemes. The term bi
t¡1(s1
t) denotes the individual’s
holdings of a range of Arrow contingent securities. In order to provide a








We assume that in equilibrium de…cits and interest rates can be formu-
lated recursively in the sense that the state variables, zt, the de…cits of all
agents, and bond prices are given by time-invariant functions of the state
variables; i.e., there exist time-invariant functions h, fi;p such that












t contains the elements of st that are measurable with respect to
st¡1; and s1
t those that are not.
10for all i,t;s1;where ¹ is the density of s1
t+1 conditional on (st;st¡1;:::). We















for all t and all realizations with probability one.
A large variety of models satisfy these assumptions, including models with
multiple agents, public goods, distorting taxation, time-non-separable utility
function, externalities, monopolistic power, market frictions, non-rational
expectations or credit constraints.
Most models in the literature guarantee that a version of (4) holds as
follows: if at least one agent i chooses an interior solution for all bonds in all
periods, this agent behaves competitively in the bond market, has full infor-















c is agent i’s marginal utility of consumption.13
At this point, we do not know much about the behavior of the bond
portfolio bi
t or its market value, vbi
t . These could depend on time, or the
realizationsof the process, orstate variablesother than z and s. In particular,
the budget constraint (1) may suggest that today’s bond portfolio depends
directly on debt in the previous period - if this were the case, debt would
be likely to display more path dependence and serial correlation than other
variables. Key to our analysis is the following result.
Proposition 1 For a model satisfying the above assumptions, given func-
tions h;f;p
A) the equilibrium portfolio of contingent bonds is given uniquely by a















is satis…ed as long as the ratio of utilities is guaranteed to be bounded.















B) The value of the equilibrium portfolio of contingent bonds vbi
t is given















for all t;i; for all realizations.
Proof (See Technical Appendix)
The …rst part of this proposition says that the bond portfolio (bi
t) at time
t is independent of the realization of s1
t; furthermore, if zt includes only real
variables, as is often the case in models under complete markets, debt is a
time-invariant function of only real variables. Past shocks (and time), and
the in‡uence they possibly had on the debt of any agent, bear no in‡uence
on today’s equilibrium value of debt. Instead, under complete markets debt
depends in a time invariant manner only on the same variables that allow for
the recursive formulation forde…citsand prices. Model 1 belowwill display an
example where this invariance is extreme, in that the government’s holdings
of Arrow securities never change.
The second part of the proposition14 shows that by contrast to the bond
portfolio, the market value of debt is in‡uenced by current shocks. Given
the de…nition of vbi
t this can only occur through the impact of shocks on
bond prices. More precisely, in the usual case where (6) holds, the impact
of today’s shock on the marginal rate of substitution and on the conditional
density will in‡uence the market value of debt. But again, in the case when
zt only contains real variables, and contrary to casual inspection of (1), the
inherited value of government debt does not directly a¤ect its market value
today.
This result motivates our claim that a model with complete markets and
with only real variables in the state vector zt is inconsistent with the high
14This result is mentioned on p.625 of Chari, Christian and Kehoe (1994) for their model.
As the main focus in that paper is to determine the stochastic properties of optimal taxes
through simulation, they do not exploit the implications of this result for the behaviour
of debt, nor do they report any statistics about the behavior of debt in their simulations.
12persistence of debt documented in section 2: part B) of the proposition says
that the market value of debt is a function of the same state variables that
determine output, therefore debt is unlikely to display more persistence than
output under those conditions.
3.2 Negative Response of Debt to De…cit Shocks
One other distinctive feature of complete markets to document is how the
market value responds to de…cit shocks. For most readers Fact 3 in the
previous section would not have been a surprise - debt in the real world
is well known to increase when de…cits rise. But it turns out that if the
primary de…cit is positively serially correlated (and Fact 2 tells us that it is),
the market value of debt under complete markets is likely to fall in response
to an increase in the de…cit. Let us build some intuition for this claim.
Consider the standard case when bond prices are given as in (6), then the
market value of debt (=¡vb
g
t) is equal to the discounted value of surpluses


















where the …rst equality comes from(1), the second equality from (19)15. Con-
sider the (empirically relevant) case that !
g
t is positively serially correlated.
Then, a high de…cit today signals higher than average future !
g
t+j. Then the
above expression implies that if a shock that increases the de…cit occurs (say,
government spending is high), the right side of equation (9) goes down and so
does the value of debt.16 To be more precise, consider the special case when
the de…cit follows an AR(1) process17 !
g
t = ½! !
g
t¡1 + "!
t with ½! > 0; and
15This expression for the value of debt is well known, but we do not know of a reference
exploring its implications for the comovement of de…cit and debt.
16Our argument pertains to business cycle ‡uctuations of de…cit and debt. One can
…nd examples where government spending and debt increase in the same period under
complete markets. One case is Example 4 in LS where a high level of g (a ”war”) occurs
with positive probability in some period, but there is no reason why a similarly high level
of spending should follow. In that example de…cits are not positively serially correlated
and our reasoning does not apply. Our argument holds for non-war periods.
17We choose an AR(1) speci…cation here both for reasons of analytical tractability but
also because using annual US data 1941-99 on the primary de…cit and standard time series
methodology an ARMA(1,0) model was the preferred speci…cation
13constant interest rates (uc;t=1). Then (9) implies that the market value of









t; and a higher primary de…cit
leads to a fall in the market value of government debt ¡vb
g
t.
The reason for this result is the following. Under complete markets agents
construct a portfolio that insures them against unanticipated variations in
future de…cits. If a high de…cit today signals higher future de…cits, agents
construct a portfolio that in the event of a high de…cit covers today’s and
the higher de…cits that follow. Hence, when the high de…cit occurs, the bond
portfolio pays out an amount larger than today’s unexpected de…cit, and the
agent …nds himself with higher than average wealth (or lower than average
debt); this wealth will be spent when the higher than average de…cits occur
in the future.
3.3 Some Examples
We now consider some speci…c models in order to illustrate the workings of
our proposition and to further back up our claim that facts 1 and 3 are not
compatible with complete markets. In the next sub-section we will simulate
these models in orderto quantify the magnitude of these e¤ects and to explore
some results that cannot be obtained analytically.
Model 1 - (No capital accumulation)
This is essentially the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983). We introduce
a productivity shock µt in order to have output shocks whose VAR can be
compared to the one we estimated in section 2.18
Output is given by yt = µt(1 ¡ lt) where lt denotes leisure. The resource
constraint is yt = ct +gt where c denotes consumption and g government ex-
penditure. The stochastic process fgt;µtg is exogenous and Markov. A con-
sumer with utility function E0
P1
t=0¯
t u(ct;lt) has access to complete bond
markets, behaves competitively, obtains a competitive wage (in equilibrium
equal to µt) for each hour worked, and pays labor taxes to the government.
The government levies a proportional tax rate ¿t on labor income, has
access to complete bond markets and faces the budget constraint
b
g







18Gorostiaga (1999) also introduces a productivity shock in a similar model.
14where bg denote governments bond holdings. The government has a …xed
initial level of bonds and chooses tax rates and government bonds so as to
maximize consumer welfare. Both the consumer and the government observe
all shocks up to the current period.
Following Lucas and Stokey, it can be shown that the Ramsey equilibrium
satis…es
(¿t;ct;lt) = G(gt;µt): (11)
for all t > 0; and a time-invariant function G:
This economy satis…es all of our assumptions19 and using our earlier nota-
tion we have the endogenous variables xt = (¿t;ct;lt); the exogenous stochas-
tic process s1
t = (gt;µt) and no variables play the role of s2
t or zt: The part





for all t > 0 and all realizations. In other words, the government always buys
the same amount of each security in equilibrium, regardless of the current
state of the economy and the period. In this model, the debt portfolio does
not respond to a shock in government spending or productivity, even though
all other equilibrium variables respond to these shocks according to (11).20





so that the market value of bonds is in‡uenced by current shocks but the
inherited value of debt has no direct in‡uence on today’s value.
Since the market value of debt, output and the de…cit are exact functions
of the exogenous shocks, the persistence of debt must be very similar to
the persistence of output and de…cit. More precisely, in the case that gt
and µt have the same serial correlation then (up to a linear approximation
to the functions Vg and G) output, debt and the de…cit all have the same
serial correlation as (gt;µt): This provides a strict proof that, in this case,
complete markets is at odds with the higher persistence of debt described in
the previous section.
19Strictly speaking, the recursivity assumptions are only satis…ed in this model for t > 0.
This changes the results in a trivial way: Proposition 1 only holds for t > 0:
20The portfolio would no longer be constant if we assumed that fgt;µtg is Markov
of order two. More precisely, if the conditional density fgt+1;µt+1jgt;µt;gt¡1;µt¡1;:::(¢) =
¹(¢;gt;µt;gt¡1;µt¡1) then, Proposition 1 implies b
g
t(¢) = Dg(¢;gt;µt).
15To prove that this model is inconsistent with Fact 3, consider the case
where (gt;µt) follow an AR(1) process. Then, up to a linear approximation,
the equilibrium de…cit is AR(1) and, as we argued in the last paragraph sub-





or not the variation in interest rates can compensate the variability of de…cit
will be explored by simulation in the next section.
Model 2 - Capital accumulation under uncertainty
A key focus of our analysis is the relative persistence of debt compared to
other variables. Model 1 was a case where debt had the same persistence as
output and de…cit. But if a state variable with large persistence is introduced
in the model, Proposition 1 B) leaves open the possibility that this state
variable in‡uences debt more than output and, therefore, it could be the
case that debt is more persistent than output under complete markets. To
see whether this is the case in a well-known framework, we introduce capital





and the resource constraint becomes
ct + kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 + gt = yt
where ± is the depreciation rate of capital.
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) (from now on CCK) show that if the
government levies capital and labor taxes, then the model can be formulated




t = (gt;µt); endogenous state variable zt = kt and the solution is a time-






so that the portfolio of debt depends only on today’s value of the capital
stock. In this case, a shock to the economy has an e¤ect on debt only to the
extent that this shock a¤ects capital. If capital has an ergodic distribution
and it ‡uctuates around a long run mean, then so does debt.





16Again, past shocks, and the in‡uence they possibly had on government debt,
bear no in‡uence on today’s equilibrium value of government debt, over and
above the e¤ect that past shocks have on current fundamentals.
This equation expresses our main …nding in model 2: under complete
markets and since only real variables appear in the vector of state variables,
the persistence of debt is no greater than the persistence of any real variable
in the system. In the previous model we could say without a doubt that if
gt and µt had the same serial correlation then debt, output and de…cit had
the same serial correlation, but the inclusion of the highly persistent state
variable kt in (13) could in‡uence di¤erently debt and output, so we can
not make a similar statement in this model. This can only be resolved by
exploring numerical solutions.
3.4 Simulations
In this subsection we solve the model numerically both to see if the failure
of the CM model is quantitatively important and to study some issues that
could not be addressed analytically.











and set ¯ =0.98 and °1=1, °2=2. We set B so that the share of leisure in
the time endowment equal to 30% on average.
In keeping with the literature, we assume g follows a truncated AR(1),







(1 ¡ ½g)g¤ + ½g gt¡1 + "
g
t
if (1 ¡ ½g)g¤ + ½g gt¡1 + "
g
t > g











t i.i.d., mean zero and mutually independent. To facilitate compar-
isons across examples, we assume both shocks have the same persistence, i.e.
½g = ½µ: We assume "µ
t » N(0;0:0072); "
g
t » N(0;1:442); g¤ = 17:5; with an
upper bound of g is 35% and g = 15% of average GDP. These values are
chosen so that in the non-stochastic steady state of Model 1, government
17expenditure amounts to 25 percent of GDP and ‡uctuates within the range
15 and 35% of output. We consider two di¤erent assumptions regarding the
persistence of the shocks: a) both sequences are i.i.d. (½g = ½µ = 0) and, b)
strongly positively serially correlated shocks ½g = ½µ = 0:95.21. For Model
2 we set ½g = ½µ = 0:95, ® = 0:4 and the depreciation rate ± = 0:05: For
the impulse response functions we used a debt limit that is never binding in
equilibrium and has the roly only of ruling out Ponzi schemes.
The focus of our analysis is how debt behaves under complete and in-
complete markets and introducing capital taxation causes problems for this
issue. CCK show that if the government has access to a full set of ex post
contingent capital taxes, these can be used to complete the markets. Our
analysis in the rest of the paper is therefore predicated on the assumption
that contingent capital taxes are unavailable to the government, and in both
models we only allow for labor taxes.22.
We use both impulse-response functions (IRF) and the k-variance ratio
to measure persistence. In using IRF’s we start by studying the response
of each variable to the fundamental shocks in the model economy (gt;µt):
We call this the ”true IRF”. We obtain the i¡th coe¢cient of the true IRF
by computing numerically how each variable would change i periods ahead
if, starting from the steady state mean, the innovation to each shock had a
realization equal to (¾"j;0;0;:::), j = g;µ. When the true IRF coe¢cients
at low frequencies are large relative to the coe¢cients at high frequencies we
will say that the variable has high persistence. In order to ensure consistency
with Section 2 we also compute the IRF by estimating an identical VAR (a
Cholesky decomposition on the de…cit ratio, GDP growth and debt ratio)
using simulated data to that we estimated in Section 2 on US data. We call
21All models are solved using the Parameterised Expectations Algorithm described in
den Haan and Marcet (1990). To solve the incomplete markets models we use the ap-
proach in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002). To solve the models with capital
accumulation we use the adaptations described in Abraham, Marcet and Scott (2001).
22CCK show simulation results where ‡uctuations in the ex post capital tax rate are
allowed to complete the market in the absence of state contingent debt. The volatility
required in capital taxes is extreme - a standard deviation of around 40 compared to a mean
of 0 (see Table 2 in CCK). Even accepting the argument in Judd (1992) that conventional
measures of capital taxes understate volatility by ignoring corporate allowances it is hard
to observe this volatility in the data. For this reason we interpret our simulation results
as showing that complete markets, whether produced by contingent bonds or contingent
capital taxes, cannot account for the empirical …ndings of Section 2. These issues are
further explored in Abraham, Marcet and Scott (2001).
18this the ”estimated IRF”. The true IRF helps us understand the properties
of our model, while the estimated IRF enable us to compare directly the
model with the data.
The dashed lines of Figures 3 to 5 show the true IRF’s of a number of
endogenous variables under complete markets, and Figure 6 shows the k-
variance ratio for various models under both complete and incomplete mar-
kets. Figure 3 shows Model 1 under i.i.d. shocks23. Not surprisingly, under
complete markets, given the i.i.d. nature of the shocks and equations (11)
and (12), all variables including debt are i.i.d., and all variables have zero
persistence, including debt. The …rst panel in the …rst column of Figure
6 shows the k-variance ratio for the same variables and shows an identical
degree of persistence across them all.
Figure 4 shows the true IRFs from the same model but now assuming
persistent shocks ½g = ½µ = 0:95. As expected from (11) and (12), under
complete markets the persistence in the shocks is passed through all the
endogenous variables and the response of each variable is now much more
distinctive. In all cases the response declines roughly geometrically, at a rate
of decay approximately equal to ½g. The middle panel of the left column in
Figure 6 shows that all variables have approximately equal persistence.
Since we have now a serially correlated de…cit we can explore if the model
explains Fact 3. Figure 4 shows that debt goes down (up) in response to a
higher gt (µt): The response of the primary de…cit to each shock is now the
opposite from that shown by debt. This con…rms the results in subsection
3.2 that persistent shocks which increase the de…cit cause debt to decrease
under CM, making this model incompatible with Fact 3.
The dashed lines in Figure 5 show the true IRFs from introducing cap-
ital accumulation as in Model 2 with complete markets. Each panel tells
interesting stories about the response of each variable, but here we will con-
centrate on the persistence of debt and the response of debt to de…cit shocks.
Note that most of the true IRFs decay to zero from an initially high level,
the main exception being the response of output to government spending,
which shows a relatively large long run negative e¤ect after an initially pos-
itive response. Also notice that the responses to the productivity shock are
longer-lived. None of the responses are humped-shaped, and certainly not
the response of debt, suggesting that persistence is about the same in all
variables. If anything, the persistence of output could be largest, given its
23The vertical axis in Figures 3 to 5 are in units of the variable under consideration.
19response to government spending. Notice that once more the de…cit and the
debt respond in opposite ways to each shock, in contradiction to Fact 3.
The …nal panel of Figure 6 con…rms that according to the k-variance ratio
output is more persistent than debt under CM. Recall that we introduced
model 2 to have a better chance to match the higher persistence of debt with
complete markets, but the result of introducing capital is to take the model
even further away from the data: output is now more persistent than debt!.
To …nally see if all these responses mix in a way that looks like the esti-
mated VAR from US data e.g Figure 1, we explore estimated IRF only for
model 2. Figure 7 shows that the estimated IRF are signi…cantly di¤erent
from those estimated using US data, most signi…cantly we see that the re-
sponse of debt does not show high persistence and that Fact 3 is strongly
rejected.
To summarize the results in this section: the complete market analysis
is inconsistent with our …ndings for US data, particularly Facts 1 and 3.
In the data, de…cit and GDP are a¤ected by …scal or GDP shocks but the
impact dies out quite quickly; however, the impact on debt is much more
persistent and takes a very long time (if ever) to fade away, the opposite
to what complete markets imply. Further, the response of debt to adverse
de…cit shocks under CM is the opposite to that observed in the data. These
results suggest that governments use variations in the market value of debt
as a bu¤er stock for …scal shocks rather than using the insurance role that
bond interest payments play in the case of complete markets.
4 Debt under Incomplete Markets
In this section we show that incomplete markets perform much better in
accounting for the data. Because market incompleteness covers a wide range
of possibilities we cannot show a completely general result. However, by
using a variety of examples combined with intuition we suggest that under
incomplete markets the persistence of government debt is greater than that
in other variables in a large variety of models, and that the response of
debt to a de…cit shock is of the observed sign. The reason for this behavior
is that under incomplete markets debt is used as a bu¤er stock to smooth
‡uctuations, and as a result a shock today in‡uences the stock of debt for a
long time.
204.1 An Intuition
Under complete markets if the government experiences, for example, un-
expectedly low revenue or high spending, it would have previously insured
against this kind of shock via issuing contingent debt, and the payo¤ from
the portfolio would help o¤set the shock and the higher than average future
shocks. But under incomplete markets it is the size of debt that helps to
partly insulate tax rates from these shocks. Consider a government that en-
forces a balanced budget in each period. Such a policy would cause taxes to
be very volatile and, under standard assumptions on preferences, leads to a
loss of welfare. A better policy (if contingent debt is not available) is to use
government debt as a bu¤er stock: by increasing debt in bad periods and de-
creasing it in good times the government could achieve smoother taxes. The
problem with …nancing the de…cit in this manner is that the higher debt will,
via the intertemporal budget constraint, generate higher interest payments
in the future and so higher future tax rates. Optimal …scal policy involves
using debt as a bu¤er stock to reduce volatility of tax rates in the very short
run, and shifting this volatility to the very far future, much in the way that
precautionary savings are used in the consumption literature. The e¤ect is
to produce long and persistent swings in debt.
This e¤ect of debt on future taxes under incomplete markets is at the
heart of the unit-root/persistence properties of taxes and debt that we outline
in this section. As shown in Barro (1979) and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent
and Seppälä (2002) (henceforth AMSS) an increase in government spending
has a permanent e¤ect on taxes (in the sense that taxes are a risk-adjusted
martingale) precisely because under incomplete markets the government uses
debt to bu¤er the impact of shocks on tax rates. As a consequence, under
incomplete markets debt displays substantial persistence compared to other
variables as well as a positive response to de…cit shocks.
4.2 An Example
We consider a special case of Model 1 that we can solve analytically. This will
help to understand that under incomplete markets debt has higher persis-
tence. The only shock to the de…cit will occur in period t = 1. The evolution
of all variables after this period can be interpreted as the response to the
shock in period 1. We will see that under incomplete markets the de…cit
responds strongly in period 1 and weakly thereafter, while the response of
21debt is permanent. This is very di¤erent from what would occur under a sim-
ilar probabilistic structure in a standard growth model, where capital stock
would converge to its steady state value so that the e¤ect of this one-time
shock would die out as time passed.
Assume, in Model 1, that gt is only random for t = 1. In particular
P(g1 = gH) = P(g1 = gL) = :5 and gH = g + ´; gL = g ¡ ´; for some
´;g > 0. Government spending is constant in all other periods: g0 = gt = g




The only …nancial asset in the economy is a risk-less one-period bond and






t = wt¿t(1 ¡ lt) + b
g
t¡1 (14)
and the de…cit is !
g
t ´ wt¿t(1 ¡ lt):
Denote with superscripts H and L the values of all variables under each
realization of g1. The following result states how a government reacts to this
shock under complete or incomplete markets.
Result 1
Under regularity assumptions (stated in the Technical Appendix)
² Under complete markets















Furthermore, debt does not respond to a de…cit shock:24
¡vb
g
t = 0 for all t = 0;1;::: and all realizations
² Under incomplete markets
24This example does not display the negative correlation of debt and de…cit under CM
which we have discussed in subsection 3.2. This is not surprising since in the present
example de…cit is not positively serially correlated.
22the de…cit has an immediate positive response to a high g1; and future




















2 = ::: (16)
All inequalities reversed (and equalities still hold) in the event g1 = gL:
See proof in the Technical Appendix.
Therefore in this stylized example debt shows a permanent response to a
…scal shock under incomplete markets: if government spending is high (low)
in period 1, debt increases (decreases) and it remains at this higher (lower)
level forever. Even if the shock dies out after one period, its e¤ect on the
de…cit is much larger in the period when the shock occurs than in the future,
and debt stays at the same level implied by the shock forever, thus displaying
a persistence greater than any other variable.
4.3 Simulations
To con…rmourintuition in the caseof fully ‡edged dynamic stochastic models
we turn once again to Models 1 and 2 and study simulations under incomplete
markets. There are many ways in which bond markets can be incomplete but
we consider the polar case where the government can only issue one period
risk free bonds. This is obviously an extreme example for, as was discussed
in the introduction, in reality governments have access to a range of di¤erent
types of bonds with varying maturities. This is important for, as shown in
Angeletos (2001) and Buera and Nicolini (2003), it is possible to achieve
the complete markets outcome so long as there exist as many maturities as
potential realizations of shocks and the yield curve shows su¢cient ‡exibility
to o¤er insurance across most states of nature25. Therefore the value of the
debt portfolio in these papers is the same as the value of debt under the
Arrow securities we considered in section 3. Hence, our …ndings in section
3 would say that data on US debt cannot be matched by the models of
Angeletos (2001) and Buera and Nicolini (2003).
25See Marcet and Scott (2001) for an investigation as to which combination of bond
issuance performs best in this respect for OECD governments.
23The only change that incomplete markets requires to our Models 1 and 2
of section 3 is that the budget constraint of the government is now (14). In
addition, we introduce now a debt limit for the government b
g
t ¸ ¡B; this
limit, in addition to ruling out Ponzi schemes, will now allow us to explore
the e¤ect of debt limits that are binding in equilibrium. For the simulations
we set B equal to 80% of average GDP. This is a loose debt limit that does
not drive the results in most periods. See section 5 for the behavior of the
model under tighter debt limits.
The results are shown in the dotted lines of Figures 3 to 5 and the right
column of Figure 6. In the i.i.d. case of Figure 3 the initial response of debt
is muted compared to other variables but it continues to accumulate so that
it eventually becomes the most a¤ected variable. The response of debt to
productivity shocks is also shifted to long lags, indicating that productivity
shocks have a highly persistent e¤ect on debt. The k-variance ratio in Figure
6 (top right panel) con…rms that the market value of debt contains more
persistence than any of the other variables. Notice also that the responses
of the de…cit and debt to each shock in the …rst few periods have the same
sign. The response of de…cit in the longer run changes sign, due to the fact
that a higher debt interest will have to be serviced in the future in response
to an increase in debt today.
When shocks are persistent, the dotted lines in Figure 4 reveal a more
complex picture. The immediate response of debt to the adverse expenditure
shock isagain small compared toothervariablesbut once moreit accumulates
so that the e¤ect of the shock is shifted to low frequencies. The same pro…le
appears in response to the persistent productivity shocks, although here the
accumulation of debt takes a lot longer. Unlike the case of complete markets,
the response of debt to both shocks is hump-shaped and eventually declines
at a slow rate. The combination of the humped response and the slower rate
of decline of the true IRF cause the k-variance ratios to reveal substantially
more persistence of debt in the case of incomplete markets - compare the
middle panels of Figure 6: debt is not only more persistent than any other
variable under incomplete markets but more than ten times as persistent as
under complete markets. If anything, the model overshoots, since now the
k-variance ratios for debt reach a value of about 4 after 10 years, while in
the data they only reached a value of 2 after 10 years
Furthermore, Figure 4 also shows that incomplete markets reverses the
response of debt to government expenditure and productivity shocks. Now
debt responds in the same way as the de…cit in the short run so that Fact 3
24can be explained by incomplete markets. We also note that under incomplete
markets, de…cits in the distant future have to decrease in order to prevent
debt from exploding as in the estimated IRF for the data.
Figure 5 con…rms all of these results for our model with capital accumu-
lation. It is interesting to note that both output and debt have a roughly
equally persistent response to an innovation in g, while the response of debt
to an innovation in µ is much more persistent than the response of output
to the same shock. Debt seems to display the greatest persistence amongst
the endogenous variables since it shows clearly humped shaped IRF, and it
increases in response to shocks that cause the primary de…cit to grow. This
is con…rmed in Figure 6, where debt displays the higher ratios.
Again, the dotted line in the lower panels of Figure 5 shows that under
incomplete markets debt responds in the same direction as de…cit at most
lags. Again, in the long run the IRF of de…cit has to reverse sign in order to
pay for the additional interest.
Model 2 also improves the …t of the k-variance ratios. In particular,
comparing the corresponding panels of Figure 6 we see that the …rst three
k-variance ratios are almost equal to one, and that the ratios for debt grow
over the computed lags, just as in the data. In any case, the persistence is
still too high in Model 2, since the debt k-variance ratios reach a value of
about 6 at 10 years lag as compared with 2 in the data. This suggests that
the nature of incomplete markets that we have assumed - the government
only being able to issue one period risk free bonds - is too extreme compared
with the options governments actually face. However, it is also apparent that
even though the government may possess some options for partly mitigating
market incompleteness they do not seem able to exploit these fully enough to
make complete markets the most relevant environment for examining optimal
…scal policy - introducing market incompleteness improves dramatically the
…t of the model with US data.26
We show the estimated IRF from Model 2 in Figure 8. This con…rms
that, in model 2, debt is more persistent than any other variable under
incomplete markets, and that debt goes up in response to a higher de…cit
when the de…cit shock is identi…ed as in the data VAR. Although this model
falls short of matching all aspects from the data VAR (facts 4 and 5 are still
26We have checked that this sort of behavior of debt under incomplete markets is present
under most parameter values and under various models that we have explored. For exam-
ple, the same sort of behavior occurs in the model of Gorostiaga (1999), which introduces
frictions in the labor market and endogenous government spending.
25unaccounted for within the framework of this paper), it is clear that under
capital accumulation incomplete markets does much better than complete
markets. Including capital accumulation improves the …t of the model with
the data and it makes the case in favor of incomplete markets even stronger.27
5 Sustainability, Debt Limits and Debt Man-
agement
A large literature has discussed the desirability of imposing limits on govern-
ment debt and ways to test for …scal sustainability, both from an academic
and a policy-oriented point of view. It is worthwhile reconsidering this issue
in the light of the above results.
We will show that under incomplete markets it is very di¢cult to dis-
tinguish between optimizing and irresponsible governments. In this environ-
ment, the virtue of debt limits is that they are an e¤ective way to ensure
sustainability of …scal policy, and they can be monitored with very little
information. On the other hand, debt limits constrain the choices of gov-
ernment and as a result will be very costly under some circumstances. We
argue that improvements in debt management are desirable not only because
it provides better insurance against shocks to the primary de…cit but also be-
cause it enables debt limits to target unsustainable policies more e¤ectively
and because it makes it easier to distinguish irresponsible from optimizing
governments.
5.1 Sustainability
We argue that the large swings in government debt that are a feature of
incomplete markets cause problems for e¤orts to assess sustainability. A
large literature has developed tests of sustainability of …scal policy.28 Many
27Our extreme assumption that rates of return are risk free may also be responsible
for producing excessive persistence. Sleet (2002), motivated by the results of this paper,
investigates the case where governments have access to private information so that rates
of return o¤er limited state contigency but markets are still incomplete. Whilst debt is
still persistent it is less so than when debt is completely risk free.
28See inter alia, Flavin and Hamilton (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1991), and Bohn
(1998). Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) discuss di¢culties in testing sustainability if
observations on debt are not available.
26of these tests have been criticized because of their low power in a statistical
sense29; we will argue they have little power in that a monitoring agency
processing information optimally would …nd it di¢cult to distinguish the
optimal (and sustainable) …scal policy from an unsustainable policy.
Consideramonitoringagency that, given T observationson the debt/GDP
ratio, has to assess whether a government is pursuing a sustainable …scal pol-
icy when, in fact, the data are generated by Model 1 with persistent shocks.
The agency does not know the true model, and assumes that the debt/output








since this would …t the data very well (in fact, the R2 coe¢cient in this
regression with model-generated data is always very close to one). We say
the …scal policy is unsustainable if b > 1: If 0 < b < 1 we say …scal policy is
sustainable and we say debt is strongly mean-reverting if b is not close to 1.
Assume that the agency processes data optimally given the AR(1) model.
The best summary of the available information is given by Bayesian posterior
probabilities for b. We say that the agency perceives that …scal policy is likely
to be unsustainable after T periods if it …nds
PostT(b ¸ 1) > PostT(b < 1) (18)
where PostT are the posterior probabilities with a sample of T observations.
If (18) holds, the agency would conclude that …scal policy is more likely
to be unsustainable than otherwise; this would be a wrong conclusion since
in our simulations the policy is, by construction, sustainable. The ques-
tion we want to study is: what is the probability that (18) holds?. Under
standard assumptions and assuming the agency has no prior beliefs on b,
the Bayesian posterior is normally distributed with mean equal to the OLS
estimator (bOLS
T ). Therefore, (18) holds if and only if bOLS
T ¸ 1, so that
the probability that the monitoring agency achieves the wrong conclusion is
Prob(bOLS
T ¸ 1):
29For example, Bohn (1998) argues that the lack of power of unit root tests plagues
most sustainability tests. The test proposed by Bohn, allows for strong increases in debt
in the face of large increases in government spending, so it would not detect unsustainable
policies that did not repay debt incurred in the face of large de…cits.
27Figure 9 shows the Monte-Carlo distribution of bOLS
T under complete and
incomplete markets from 500 simulations. The data are simulations of Model
1 with persistent shocks and where T=40. Under complete markets we have
E(bOLS
T ) =0.814, but under incomplete markets E(bOLS
T ) =0.988. Hence,
under incomplete markets, the optimal policy is on average perceived to be
borderline unsustainable. More striking is the fact that in only 0.6% of
cases did bOLS
T exceed 1 under complete markets, compared to 48% under
incomplete markets. These are the probabilities that (18) holds.
In other words, since government policy is sustainable in Model 1 (in fact,
it is optimal within all sustainable …scal policies) the agency would almost
never reach the wrong conclusion as in (18) under complete markets, but
under incomplete markets it would reach the wrong conclusion almost half of
the times. The monitoring agency might just as well forget about posterior
probabilities and decide if …scal policy is sustainable by tossing a coin!. The
reason for this substantial error is that the large and sustained swings in the
debt/output ratio that are optimal under incomplete markets and persistent
shocks will often be mistaken as explosive and unsustainable path for debt
unless allowance is made for the incompleteness of bond markets. Another
way to say this is that the debt/output ratio is weakly (strongly) mean
reverting under incomplete (complete) markets. So under complete markets
a test of mean reversion is likely to give a correct answer, not so under
incomplete markets.
5.2 Debt Limits
The fact that it is so di¢cult to test for sustainability under incomplete mar-
kets can be used to make a case for imposing debt limits as a way to ensure
sustainability. Debt limits are costly, but if they help to ensure sustainability,
it may be worthwhile imposing them. We now turn to consider the cost of
debt limits for an optimizing government.
To investigate the extent to which debt limits in‡uence optimal debt and
taxes, we simulated Model 1 under three di¤erent assumptions about debt
limits: tight debt limits which bind at 10% of steady state GDP, moderate
limits of 40% of steady state GDP and …nally loose constraints of 105% of
steady state GDP. The results are shown in Table 1. Under the assumption
of i.i.d. shocks and complete markets the variations in the market value of
debt are minimal (a result consistent with Proposition 1). Under incomplete
28markets debt ‡uctuations are more noticeable but constraints rarely bind.30
In the case of persistent shocks, even under complete markets the model
generates substantial variation in the debt/GDP ratio. As the range of
variation from the loose debt limits show, in the face of incomplete markets
the debt/GDP ratio needs to show enormous variation.
Viewed from the perspective of these simulations the problem with debt
limits is clear: they fail todiscriminate between governments which have been
unlucky and require large variations in debt to pursue an optimal (incomplete
markets) …scal policy and governments who are pursuing insolvent policies
which also produce a large increase in debt. Debt limits ensure sustainability
at the cost of further constraining those governments that are experiencing
bad times. Unless debt management helps insulate tax rates from adverse
shocks then an optimizing government will often experience a binding debt
limit in bad periods.
5.3 Debt management and Fiscal Policy
Our analysis provides a clear role for debt management - to buy/issue secu-
rities which o¤er a negative covariance between interest payments and the
primary de…cit and so reduce ‡uctuations in debt and tax rates. The better
debt management is, the more appropriate the complete market model is in
explaining the data. Getting closer to complete markets is important for two
reasons: it helps reduce the volatility of taxes in a direct way, and it makes
sustainability easy to test by requiring debt to have a strong reversion to
the mean (a low b in equation (17)), therefore eliminating the need for harsh
measures such as debt limits to ensure sustainability.
Table 2 shows some details from our simulations of Models 1 and 2. As
to be expected in all the complete market models the negative correlation
between interest paymentsand the primary de…cit islargerthan underincom-
plete markets and as a consequence tax rates show very little volatility. As
emphasized in Scott (2003) tax rates change only because of variations in the
elasticity of labor supply and not because of shocks to the government’s in-
tertemporal budget constraint. Because the elasticity of labor supply changes
very little there is little variation in taxes under complete markets. But when
30Notice the asymmetry in the behaviour of debt - the minimum values are always
greater in absolute value than the peaks. This is a similar …nding to Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (1994) who …nd that because of precautionary motives governments try and
accumulate assets to avoid hitting the upper bound on debt limits.
29governments issue only risk free debt, interest payments can no longer en-
sure the intertemporal budget constraint holds: debt goes up in response to
a higher de…cit, and taxes have to increase in the distant future in order to
pay for the higher interest payments. Hence, taxes need to be more vari-
able and, in particular, they need to have a large low-frequency variability,
as found in our k-variance ratios of the previous section. In Model 1 with
persistent shocks taxes are ten times more volatile in the incomplete market
model, whereas in Model 2 they are 17 times more volatile. It is interesting
to note that the negative correlation between interest payments and the pri-
mary de…cit is larger for the case of persistent shocks than for i.i.d. shocks.
Because in our model we assume the government can only issue one-period
risk-free debt, interest payments are unable to adjust to these i.i.d. shocks.
However, when shocks are persistent future interest rates are also a¤ected
and this provides some insurance to the government.
Another interesting feature of our simulations is how under complete mar-
kets the primary de…cit is more volatile compared to the incomplete markets
case. Under complete markets taxes respond less to government expenditure
shocks so that shocks feed through mostly into the primary de…cit. However,
swings in the primary de…cit are o¤set by ‡uctuations in interest payments to
produce very limited ‡uctuations in the total de…cit. By contrast, under in-
complete markets taxes shift in the same direction as government expenditure
shocks reducing the volatility of the primary de…cit. Therefore incomplete
markets lead to a more muted automatic …scal stabilizer.
6 Conclusion
We have characterized the optimal behaviour of government debt under both
complete and incomplete …nancial markets. When markets are complete gov-
ernment debt shows the same or less persistence than other variables in the
economy; furthermore, debt falls in response to a higher de…cit. US data
is inconsistent with both of these implications of complete markets: debt
is more persistent than de…cit and output, and debt goes up with a higher
de…cit. Both puzzles are solved by the introduction of incomplete markets.
This observation allows us to test complete versus incomplete markets and to
conclude that the latter …ts better the data. Testing complete versus incom-
plete markets is not straightforward but concentrating on the implications
for debt has provided a clear-cut test.
30As stressed in the introduction we have had to make an assumption about
government behavior, and we have used the maintained hypothesis of Ramsey
behavior. This leaves open the possibility that the data can be explained by
complete markets and non-Ramsey taxation. Examining alternative models
for taxation is beyond the scope of this project, even if a tractable and
widely accepted alternative existed (which it does not). However, the logic of
Section 4 is likely to extend to a wide category of assumptions on government
behavior. The observed higher persistence of debt, and the fact that debt
and de…cit go up together, will be present whenever debt is used as a bu¤er
stock to smooth out de…cit ‡uctuations. As long as a government cares about
reducing the impact of shocks on the economy, it will use the payo¤ of the
debt portfolio to smooth de…cit shocks under complete markets, but it will
have to resort to the use of debt as a bu¤er stock to smooth de…cit shocks
under incomplete markets. This is why we think our results are likely to go
well beyond the two Models we use and Ramsey taxation in general.
We have modelled incomplete marketsby assuming that only a one-period
real riskless bond is available to the government.31 Certainly, most govern-
ments have access to policy instruments that allow them to construct richer
debt portfolios (varying maturity, indexed or conventional debt, etc). If these
instruments were thought to e¤ectively complete markets in the real world
then they would su¤er from the same two puzzles of complete markets we
have outlined (lack of persistence in debt and perverse response of debt to
de…cit shocks). The fact that the complete market model has di¢culty ac-
counting for the observed behaviour of debt is perhaps not surprising when
one considers three commonly suggested mechanisms for achieving market
completeness: state contingent capital taxation, state contingent in‡ation
and issuing full maturity of bonds. In order to achieve market completeness
through these mechanisms some extreme behaviourneeds to be assumed. Ex-
ceedingly high volatility of in‡ation or capital taxes would be needed in order
to complete markets with these instruments32. Furthermore, the conjecture
by Angeletos, Buera and Nicolini that issuing a wide variety of di¤erent
31It is beyond the scope of this paper to endogeneize the reason for market incomplete-
ness. This is a promising avenue of research. Sleet (2002), building on the results of our
paper, provides a private information explanation for the behavior of government debt.
32CCK (1991) report in Table 3 that the standard deviation of in‡ation with uncon-
tingent debt is either 20% or 60% depending on the degree of risk aversion. CCK (1994)
report in Table 2, that the standard deviation of capital taxes with uncontingent debt is
41% or 30%, again depending on risk aversion.
31maturity bonds can complete the market can only be achieved with extreme
portfolio holdings of di¤erent maturities.33 Since we do …nd that, in a certain
sense, our assumption on market incompleteness (only one period risk free
bonds) is too extreme (we refer here to the fact that the k-variance ratio for
debt is too high even for Model 2, see subsection 4.3) studying models where
these instruments have a role in providing better insurance is a promising
avenue for research. But enough rigidities would be needed so that these
instruments are not able to go all the way and e¤ectively complete mar-
kets, and to allow that the bu¤er stock behavior of debt plays a su¢ciently
important role.34
Our …nding of the importance of incomplete markets suggests two other
directions for research. Our result shows that there are signi…cant shocks
to the …scal de…cit which are not hedged by current US debt management.
Discovering theseshocksand howto hedgeagainst them(if possible) promises
to reduce ‡uctuations in the level of US debt and volatility in tax rates. In
addition, given the presence of incomplete markets our results suggest that
a crude approach to debt limits as a sign of ine¢cient …scal management
may be misleading and that a more detailed examination of sustainability
is required. Finally, while our focus has been entirely on the government
sector, much of the analysis is of a greater generality and its application
to discover the importance of market incompleteness faced by other agents
in the economy, such as household, corporate or even the nation, is worth
pursuing.
33Buera and Nicolini (2003) calibrate an example where the government has to go very
long or very short on various maturities, by as much as 500 or 600% GDP, in order to
complete markets.
34Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) study a model with incomplete markets and in‡ation
policy where in‡ation can not complete the markets due to sticky prices.
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36Data Appendix
We use annual US data. Data for the total de…cit, government expendi-
ture and tax revenue from 1900 to 1999 was from the Economic Report of
the President and downloaded from www.ibert.org/de…cit.html. The BEA
website provided current and constant price GDP (available from 1900 and
1929 respectively). Interest payments were available on a …scal year basis
from 1940 onwards at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget. These were con-
verted into a calendar year basis by multiplying adjoining years by 0.25 and
0.75 e.g. 1941 interest payments were calculated as 0.75 of 1940/41 …scal
year payments plus 0.25 of 1941/42 …scal payments. The resulting series was
then removed from the total de…cit series to arrive at a primary de…cit series
from 1940 onwards.
The main complication was in …nding a consistent series for the market
value of US government debt. Seater(1981) providesan annual series for1919
to 1975. Cox and Hirschorn (1983) provide a monthly series between 1945
and 1980. As the latter shows these two studies arrive at highly consistent
results. Butkiewicz (1983) outlines a more time e¢cient way of calculating
the series and again reveals discrepancies to be small between the alternative
approaches. We therefore construct a market value series from 1919 to 1999
using a) Seater for 1919 to 1975 b) Cox and Hirschorn 1976-1980 and c)
extend the series to 1999 using Butkiewicz formula and OECD data, Central
Government Debt Statistics. The full data is available upon request.
Although we have been careful to do our study with the market value of
debt, which is the appropriate counterpart of debt in the model, the results
in section 2 stay almost the same for a measure of the total outstanding debt
from OECD.
37Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, since st is Markov and given (2), (3), (4), the conditional
expectations involving future de…cits conditional on the past are a function
only of (st;zt¡1); therefore Di satisfying (8) is time-invariant.










































for all t;i. The …rst equality uses (1) and (4), the second equality uses the
de…nition of conditional expectation, and the third equality is obtained by
recursive forward substitution of the random variable bi
t(s1
t+1) and (5).
To show that Di(¢;s2
t+1;zt) is an equilibrium portfolio it is enough to
show that this portfolio satis…es the budget constraint (1) for all t;i and all




































































Here, the …rst equality follows fromthe de…nition of Di and the law of iterated
expectations, the second equality again from the de…nition of Di, the third
equality from the de…nition of conditional expectation and the fact that s2
t




t+1;zt), the budget constraint of all agents
is satis…ed, so that this gives the equilibrium portfolio.
To establish part B) note that the Markov and recursivity assumptions























Assumptions and Proof of Result 1 in Subsection 4.2.
The …rst order conditions of the consumer and of the Ramsey optimizer
under both complete and incomplete markets imply35
H
0(lt) = 1 ¡ ¿t (21)
H
0(lt) + ¸t [1 ¡ H
0(lt) + H
00(lt)(1 ¡ lt)] = 0 (22)
where ¸t is the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint.
We now state some assumptions on H. Denote by ¤(¢) the function map-
ping feasible revenue values into the corresponding multiplier ¸ guaranteeing
that (22) is satis…ed; Formally, for any feasible R, ¤ is de…ned as
¤(R) ´ ¡
1 ¡ H0(l) + H00(l)(1 ¡l)
H0(l)
where l is the corresponding labor satisfying R ´ (1 ¡ H0(l))(1 ¡ l).
We assume H is such that ¤ is monotone36. We also need to assume
sup
e R;b R2(g¡2´;g+2´)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¤0(e R)
¤0(b R)









¯ ¯ ¯ > 1, the above condition restricts the sup not to be too
far from 1. This requires that the derivative does not change too much
35See, for example, AMSS.
36Su¢cient conditions on H for this result are found in footnote 14 in AMSS.
39in the relevant range for revenues or, in words that ”¤ is su¢ciently lin-
ear around g”. In particular, if H is linear-quadratic as in many of the
examples of Lucas and Stokey (83) this condition is trivially satis…ed. An-
other su¢cient condition is that ¤00 is su¢ciently small in the sense that




¯ ¯ ¯ <
¡ log(1¡¯)
4´ This is because, in this case
log
¯ ¯ ¯¤(e R)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¡ log
¯ ¯ ¯¤(b R)
¯ ¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¤00(e e R)
¤0(f e R)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
4´ < ¡log(1 ¡ ¯)
In the usual case that ¯ is close to 1 this is not a very restrictive assumption.
We assume that there is an interior solution with probability one in all
periods for both the consumer and the government.
Proof
For the government spending process above we have
Et (gt+j) = g for all t ¸ 0 and for all j > 0: (24)
Following Lucas and Stokey (1983), under complete markets (22) is sat-
is…ed with ¸t = ¸ for all t. This, together with (21) implies that leisure and
taxes are constant, say lcm = lt; ¿cm = ¿t.











t (E0(gt) ¡ ¿
cm(1 ¡ l
cm)) =
g ¡¿cm(1 ¡ lcm)
1 ¡ ¯
where the …rst equality uses u0
c = 1; the second equality uses constancy of
taxes and leisure, and the third equality uses (24). Therefore,
!
g
t = gt ¡ ¿
cm(1 ¡ l
cm) = g ¡ ¿
cm(1 ¡l







H ¡ g = ´ > !
g
0 t = 1
This proves the statements about the de…cit under complete markets.







j (Et (gt+j) ¡¿
cm(1 ¡ l
cm)) = 0
40for all t; where the …rst equality follows from (9) and constancy of taxes and
hours, and the second equality follows from (24) and our analysis of de…cit.
This shows our statements about debt under complete markets.
Under incomplete markets, following AMSS we have that the …rst order
conditions of the planner are (21), (22), the budget constraint and
¸t = Et(¸t+1) (25)
for all t. Since there is no uncertainty after period 1, (25) implies that
Et(¸t+1) = ¸t+1 for all t ¸ 1, so that ¸t = ¸1 for all t ¸ 1: Then (22) implies
l1 = lt and (21) ¿1 = ¿t for all t ¸ 1 and all realizations, and since g is also




t for all t > 2 and all realizations,
proving the equalities of (15).
From proposition 1 in AMSS, and since in this example pb









t+j for all t: (26)






g ¡ ¿1(1 ¡ l1)
1 ¡ ¯
for all t ¸ 1
which proves the equalities in (16).




0: Since (26) and the




1¡¯ , and by assumption b
g
¡1 = 0, the
budget constraint of the government at periods 0 and 1 imply
¯
¡1(¿0(1 ¡ l0) ¡ g) = b
g
0 = g1 ¡ ¿1(1 ¡l1) + ¯
g ¡ ¿1(1 ¡ l1)
1 ¡¯
(27)
Let us denote revenue by Rt ´ ¿t(1 ¡ lt). Since the last equation holds for
both realizations of g1 and b
g























1 = (1 ¡ ¯)2´ > 0: (29)
41Given the process for g, (25) at t = 0 implies
¤(R0) =
¤(RH






1 and ¤ is monotone we have
R
H
1 ¸ R0 ¸ R
L
1 (31)
Assume towards a contradiction that RH
1 < g: Then equation (28) would
imply that b
g
0 > 0 and (31) that R0 < g: Together with the …rst equality
in (27) we have that b
g
0 < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, RH
1 > g.
Similarly, we could prove RL













1 ) ¡ ¤(R0) =
¤(RH

















(1 ¡ ¯)´ (33)
where the …rst and third equalities follow from the mean-value theorem for
some R; R 2 (RL
1;RH
1 ); the second equality from (30) and the last equality
from (29). This equation implies the …rst inequality in
R
H
1 ¡ R0 ·
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¤0(R)
¤0(R)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1 ¡ ¯)´ < ´
and the last inequality follows because (32) implies
¯ ¯ ¯R ¡ R
¯ ¯ ¯ · 4´ and from
the bound in equation (23)
Thus we have RH
1 ¡R0 < ´ and since gH





All the remaining inequalities stated about incomplete markets follow
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          Figure 3 
                      True IRF, Model 1 (iid Shocks)  
 
 
         Figure 4 
            True IRF Model 1 (Persistent Shocks)   
 
 
          Figure 5 
True IRF, Model 2 (Capital accumulation, persistent Shocks)   
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Debt Limit Issues 
 
         

















Model 1.a         
Complete 
Markets 
-1.4  -0.5  -  - 
Incomplete 
Markets – Tight 
Limits 




-25.7  20.1  0  0 
Model 1.b         
Complete 
Markets 









-36.0  40.0  0  0.3 
Model 2         
Complete 
Markets 





-37.9  55.1  0  0.4 
  
Table 2 
Debt Management Issues 
 
  Standard Deviations   













Model 1.a           
Complete 
Markets 
  0.018  0.017  0.002  -0.837 
Incomplete 
Markets 
  0.017  0.017  0.006  -0.139 
Model 1.b            
Complete 
Markets 
  0.046  0.029  0.006  -0.992 
Incomplete 
Markets 
  0.020  0.017  0.052  -0.574 
Model 2           
Complete 
Markets 
  0.047  0.040  0.005  -0.593 
Incomplete 
Markets 
  0.026  0.023  0.083  -0.380 
 
 
 
 